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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
BECO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
PlaintiffiAppellant, 
v. 
J-U-B ENGINEERS, INC., an Idaho corporation, 
DefendantiRespondent 
Supreme Court No. 35873 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Bannock County. 
Honorable Peter D. McDermott, District Judge, presiding 
Bryan D. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant 
C. Tom Arkoosh, Esq., and Daniel A. Nevala., Esq., residing at Boise, Idaho, for Respondent 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal asks the Court to decide whether the district court properly exercised 
discretion in determining and awarding attorney fees to J-U-B. BECO's conclusory allegations 
that the court abused its discretion are amply contradicted by the record. A reading of the district 
court's decision demonstrates that the court conducted a reasoned analysis of the evidence and 
considered the relevant factors under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) before awarding J-U-B attorney fees in 
the amount of $41,140. 
In 2008, this Court remanded the fee issue back to the district court with instructions to 
determine and award fees to J-U-B for defending against BECO's breach of contract claim. 
Even though the district tout followed this Court's instructions and acted within its discretion in 
awarding fees to J-U-B, BECO refuses to accept the decision and argues that J-U-B is not 
entitled to any fees. Losing twice on summary judgment, once on appeal, and once after remand, 
particularly where powerful evidence supported each decision, by no means furnishes a basis for 
BECO to attaclc the credibility of the district court by alleging that it acted out of vindication for 
its own sense of justice in awarding J-U-B additional fees. 
BECO's original lawsuit claimed that J-U-B had delayed BECO's work on a construction 
project, thereby subjecting BECO to liability for liquidated damages. J-U-B successfully 
defended itself on all claims at the district court and was awarded attorney fees in the amount of 
$75,351.42 which prompted BECO's first appeal. 
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That appeal resulted in this Court's decision in BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B 
Engineers, Inc. 145 Idaho 719 (2008) to affirm the district court's summary judgment order and 
partially remand the fee award for a determination and award of fees to J-U-B for defending 
against the contract claim. On remand, the district court complied with the directions from this 
Court by awarding J-U-B attorney fees, with interest, in the amount of $35,600 for defending 
against the breach of contract claim and then awarded J-U-B an additional $5,540 for costs and 
fees incurred in preparing additional briefing on the issue at BECO's insistence. In reaching its 
decision, the district court revisited the existing record and considered, at a minimum, the expert 
testimoily of John Bailey, the complexity of the issues, the experience of counsel for J-U-B, the 
reasonableness of the hourly rate charged, the nature of the work performed, and the objections 
raised by BECO,'~ coupled with the briefing and oral argument of counsel. By properly 
considering the evidence in the record and the factors outlined in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), the court 
showed that it understood the issue as one of discretion, that it acted within the bounds of that 
discretion, and that it exercised reason in awarding fees to J-U-B. 
2. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The introduction to the district court's June 12, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order 
provides a succinct chronology of the major events in the bistory of this case.3 In summary, 
BECO's original complaint was against the City of PocatelIo and J-U-B as codefendants, 
' See Clerk's Record ARer Remand, p. 65. 
Consistent with Appellant's Brief, this brief shall reference the Clerk's Record after remand as "Clerk's Record 
After Remand" since the Clerk's Record ARer Remand has no volume designation. See Appellant's Brief at 
footnote 1 and Clerk's Record After Remand, p. 65. 
'See Clerk's Record After Remand, pp. 37-39. 
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claiming breach of contract with regard to both defendants, negligence with regard to both 
defendants, and intentional interference against J-u-B.~ The City settled with and BECO shortly 
after the suit was filed. J-U-B then filed its first summary judgment motion and supporting 
memorandum prompting BECO to withdraw its breach of contract claim just before the hearing 
after J-U-B pointed out in the briefing that there was no direct contractual relationship between 
the two parties and BECO was not a third party beneficiary to the contract J-U-B had entered 
with the Pocatello Development ~ u t h o r i t ~ . '  As a result of that motion, the court ruled in J-U- 
B's favor on the negligence claim but denied summary judgment on the intentional interference 
with contract claim.6 
Then, after receiving and reviewing BECO's discovery responses, J-U-B filed a second 
summary judgment motion and memorandum in support of the r n o t i ~ n . ~  After reviewing the late 
discovery, J-U-B learned that BECO's project notes directly contradicted the statements BECO's 
witness had made in his affidavit opposing J-U-B's first summary judgment motion.' The court 
ruled in J-U-B's favor on the second summary judgment motion and then awarded J-U-B 
attorney fees.g BECO appealed this decision and asked this Court to reverse the second 
summary judgment order and fee award. This Court affirmed the summary judgment order and 
partially vacated the fee award by remanding the issue back to the district court for a 
4 R. Vol. I, pp. 1-23. 
5 R. Vol. I, pp. 33-53. 
6 R. Vol. 111, pp.481-500. 
7 R. Vol. 111, pp. 533-553. 
'R. Vol. 111, pp. 533-553. 
R. Vol. 111, pp. 650-678. 
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determination and award of fees to J-U-B for defending against the breach of contract claim. 
BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc. 145 Idaho 719 (2008). 
Subsequently, BECO filed a motion to release its cash deposit from the district court and 
a hearing was held on the issue.1° At the hearing, the court expressed its perception that this 
Court had instructed it to determine and award attorney fees to J-U-B and that it would take the 
issue of releasing the cash deposit under advisement and issue a ruling." BECO then argued that 
it needed to have the opportunity to prepare additional briefing on the fee issue.'' J-U-B argued 
that the record was replete with evidence that would allow the court to determine and award fees 
to J-U-B for defending against the breach of contract claim and to require additional briefing 
would constitute a waste of time and resources for both the court and the parties.'3 The court 
allowed BECO the chance to file a brief but informed it that it would be responsible for the cost 
of J-U-B's brief.14 
The court then entered a decision denying BECO's request to release all of the cash 
deposit, ruling that it would be inappropriate to release the funds until the court had determined 
the appropriate award of fees to J-U-B.'~ Finally, the district court entered a decision which 
prompted this appeal by awarding J-U-B fees in the amount of $35,600 for defending the 
contract claim, $5,540 for researching and preparing the additional briefing on the fee issue, and 
10 See Clerk's Record After Remand, pp. 16. 
I I TI. Vol. I, pp. 20-25. 
I2 Tr. Vol. I, pp. 20-25. 
'' Tr. Vol. I, pp. 20-25. 
'' Tr. Vo1. I, pp. 20-25. 
Is See Clerk's Record After Remand, pp. 37-42. 
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ordering that J-U-B be paid from the funds on deposit with the court, the balance to be remitted 
to BECO.'~ 
3. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Court's prior decision in BECO Const Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc. 145 Idaho 
719 (2008), partially remanded the issue of attorney fees back to the district court for a 
determination and award of fees to J-U-B for defending itself against BECO's breach of contract 
claim. The district court had previously awarded costs and fees to J-U-B in the amount of 
$75,398.42.17 Prior to the award, the court had conducted a hearing on the attorney fees issue 
and J-U-B had presented evidence in support of the award which included billing recordsI8, 
testimony from experienced Idaho attorney, John ~ a i l e y ' ~ ,  an affidavit of counsel in support of 
the awardz0, a Memorandum of Costs and ~ees'', a Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Attorney Fees and Sanction.?', and oral argument from counselz3. BECO filed a brief opposing 
the award but did not present any evidence to counter the testimony from Mr. 
Afler the remand, the district court held a hearing on BECO's motion to release its cash 
deposit. At this hearing, the court heard argument from both sides over releasing the case 
deposit and also about awarding attomey fees to J -u -B .~~  J-U-B argued that the record contained 
l 6  see Clerk's Record After Remand, 
" R. Vol. IV, p. 816. 
R. Vol. IV, pp. 687-708. 
'%ee Clerk's Record After Remand, 
R. Vol. IV, pp. 780-782. 
R. Vo1. IV, pp. 681-686. 
R. Vol. IV, pp. 709-715. 
'' See Clerk's Record After Remand, 
Z4 R. Vol. IV, pp. 739-754. 
25 T. Vol. I, pp. 8-25. 
p. 66. 
pp. 26-29. 
pp. 24-3 1. 
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enough information to allow the district court to determine and award J-U-B its fees for 
defending against the contract claim.26 J-U-B further argued that up to the point that the breach 
of contract claim was dismissed, the fees incurred by J-U-B were for defending against the 
breach of contract claim and J-U-B should be awarded such fees.27 BECO argued that J-U-B 
needed to specifically explain and expound upon the entries in its billing records and that it 
needed to prepare additional briefing on the issue.'* The court advised the parties to file 
simultaneous briefs on the attorney fees issue and advised J-U-B to also file a cost bill for the 
additional fees for having to file the brief.29 
11. DISCUSSION 
1. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Attorney fees are awarded in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the party refuting 
the award must show an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co,, 138 Idaho 611, 613 (Idaho 2003). When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of 
discretion by a trial court, the sequence of inquiry is: (I) whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by the exercise of 
reason. The test for abuse of discretion concerns whether the trial court correctly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of its discretion consistent with the legal 
26 T. Vol. I, pp. 16-17. 
27 T. Vol. I, pp. 22-23. 
28 T. Vol. I, pp. 18-21. 
29 T. Vo1. I, pp. 24-25. 
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standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Thornson v. Olsen, 205 P.3d 1235, 1239 (2009), (citing Weeks 
v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 837 (2007)). 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY PERCEIVED THE ISSUE OF 
DETERMINING AND AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO J-U-B AS ONE 
OF DISCRETION AND PROPERLY ACTED WITHING THE BOUNDS 
ITS DISCRETION BY CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT 
AND EXERCISING REASON IN REACHING ITS DECISION. 
A. The district court satisfied all three parts of the abuse of discretion test. 
As stated above, the abuse of discretion test has three parts. The first requires that the 
court correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion. During the June 9, 2008 hearing on 
Plaintifs Motion for Release of Cash Deposit, the district court pointed out to counsel by 
quoting partly from this Court's prior decision that: 
"...Idaho Code 12-120(3) does not provide the basis for the key award to J-U-B 
after the point where the contractual claim was dismissed. Up to that point, J-U-B 
is entitled to its fees for defending against the contract claim. So, the issue isn't 
whether or not they're entitled to fees; that has already been resolved by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. The only issue is the amount.. . . ,JO 
This statement shows that the district court correctly perceived the decision to determine and 
award attorney fees to J-U-B for defending against the breach of contract claim as not only 
within its discretion, but as the only reason this Court remanded the case to the district court. In 
taking the issue of releasing the cash under advisement and then advising the parties to submit 
additional briefing on the attorney fee issue, the court's actions are consistent with this perceived 
discretion. 
3%ee Tr. Vol. I, p.13. 
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The second and third parts of the abuse of discretion test require that the court act within 
the boundaries of its discretion consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it, and reach its decision by an exercise of reason. In meeting these two 
parts of the test, the court properly considered the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and exercised 
reason in reaching its decision to award fees to J-U-B 
In Idaho, the method of calculating reasonable attorney fees is set forth in Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 54(e)(3). Monsanto Co. v. Paczj?Corp, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27565 (D. Idaho 
Apr. 24, 2006). I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(3) requires the court to consider the following factors in 
determining the amount of attorney fees: 
In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it 
shall consider the following factors in determining the amount of such fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience 
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the 
case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
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(J) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal 
Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a 
party's case. 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case 
The language of the court's Memorandum Decision and Order dated October 29, 2008 
provides insight into how the court reached its decision. It shows that the court considered most, 
if not all, of the twelve factors laid out under this rule before reaching its decision that the fees J- 
U-B incurred prior to BECO withdrawing its contract claim were incurred defending against that 
In reaching its decision, the court reconsidered the testimony of J-U-B's expert witness. 
At the August 7, 2006 fee hearing, the court considered the testimony of Pocatello attorney John 
~ a i l e ~ . ~ ~  Mr  Bailey was a witness called by J-U-B. He stated, that among other things, the 
work done and the rate charged by J-U-B's counsel was reasonable and that the summary 
judgment decisions in this case were well reasoned.33 He also stated that in his opinion BECO's 
complaint was not well re~earched .~~  The court questioned both Mr. Bailey and counsel for J-U- 
B about the nature of defending a lawsuit of this type. Mr. Bailey further opined on the nature of 
defending against a construction case and also about defending specifically against BECO, 
concluding that litigation against BECO is difficult and unreasonably time consuming.35 
31 See Clerk's Record After Remand, pp. 65-66. 
32 See Clerk's Record After Remand, p. 65. 
13 See Clerk's Record After Remand, pp. 26-27 at pp. 24-27. 
j 4  See Clerk's Record After Remand, p. 27 at pp. 25-26. 
" See Clerk's Record After Remand, pp. 26-27 at pp. 24-27. 
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In reaching its decision, the court considered the volumes of documents J-U-B's counsel 
had to review in defending the case. The underlying case beneath this appeal involved a 
document intensive construction case which resulted in time consuming document review at the 
initial stages. When J-U-B was first served the complaint it had no idea why it was being sued. 
J-U-B knew it hadn't contracted with BECO. As explained at length in the briefing done for the 
first appeal, there were two separate contracts; a design contract between J-U-B and the 
Pocatello Development Authority and a construction contract between BECO and the City of 
Pocatello. J-U-B could not comprehend why BECO would sue J-U-B in contract. These 
concerns all had to be sorted out by J-U-B's counsel and explained to the court through summary 
judgment briefs. 
The court also considered the billing records showing the work done by J-U-B's counsel. 
J-U-B presented the court with evidence to support an award of fees. BECO presented no 
evidence at the fee hearing to refute Mr. Bailey's testimony or to establish that J-U-B's fees were 
in any way unreasonable. J-U-B apportioned its fees by arguing to the court that the amount of 
fees incurred by J-U-B prior to BECO withdrawing its breach of contract claim were all incurred 
to defend the breach of contract claim. The work J-U-B's counsel did at the beginning of this 
case was necessary to defend the lawsuit and would have been done regardless if there was one 
claim or three. Regardless of whether J-U-B separated out each individual time entry and 
labeled it as being spent defending against the contract claim, the court was capable of reviewing 
the billing records and considering all of the factors outlined by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and reaching a 
decision which is exactly what it did. 
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In the alternative, if this Court disagrees with the district court's decision that the work 
done by J-U-B was done defending against the contract claim, the Court could hold that the same 
result could have been reached if the district court had held that BECO's unjustifiable claims 
were made and pursued frivolously. This Court chose to apply the "right result/wrong reason" 
test in its previous opinion in this case by holding that because J-U-B was not a stranger to the 
construction contract between BECO and the City of Pocatello, J-U-B could not have interfered 
with the contract. Beco Constr. Co. v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 724 (2008). It is clear 
that J-U-B's billing records did not change from when they were first submitted to the court. It 
is also clear that Mr. Bailey's testimony that BECO's complaint was not well researched and that 
the case was brought and pursued frivolously did not change. The district court considered both 
of these pieces of evidence, along with the rest of the record, before reaching its decision. 
In addition to the testimony of Mr. Bailey and the billing records, the court also reviewed 
the Memorandum of Costs filed by counsel for J-U-B, the Memorandum in Support, and 
BECO's  objection^.^^ In support of the Memorandum of Costs, J-U-B filed and Afidavdt of 
Counsel Regarding Memorandum of Costs and Fees which further supported the claim that the 
attorney's fees incurred by J-U-B were incurred at a reasonable rate and in accordance with the 
fees charged by attorneys with similar skill and experience, and the other factors laid out in 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).37 Adding all of this together, BECO's argument that J-U-B provided the court 
with no evidence or that the court had no evidence to consider before making its decision to 
36 See Clerk's Record After Remand, p. 66. 
37 R. Vo1. IV. p. 78 1. 
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award fees to J-U-B is baseless. The court properly considered the evidence and made a 
reasoned decision. Thus, this Court should uphold the district court's resulting decision. 
B. The district court did not award additional fees to "vindicate its own sense of 
justice" as BECO argues. 
At the hearing on BECO's motion to release the cash deposit, BECO argued that J-U-B 
was not entitled to any fees because the record contained inadequate evidence to support an 
award. J-U-B argued that the court had ample evidence to determine and make an award of fees. 
BECO wanted to have a separate hearing on the fee issue and insisted on having the opportunity 
to file additional briefing on the issue over the objection by J - u - B . ~ ~  The court allowed BECO 
the opportunity to brief the issue and ordered J-U-B to submit additional briefing on the issue 
along with a cost bill that would be paid by B E C O . ~ ~  Thus, the court determined that J-U-B was 
the prevailing party and acted within its discretion in awarding the additional fees to J-U-B. 
All the court did by allowing additional briefing was give BECO an opportunity to 
establish its failing claim. BECO paid lip service to both the court's authority and the fact that it 
was really only arguing about the amount of fees, but in reality, it was raising the issue of J-U- 
B's entitlement to the fee and advising the court that any decision other than one that satisfied 
BECO would likely be appealed. 
J-U-B, on the other hand, argued that sufficient evidence existed in the record to support 
an award of reasonable fees. A party claiming attorney fees does not even have to submit 
evidence as to what is a reasonable fee. 
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What is a reasonable attorneys' fee is a question for the determination of the 
court, taking into consideration of the nature of the litigation, the amount involved 
in the controversy, the length of time utilized in preparation for and the trial of the 
case and other related factors viewed in the light of the knowledge and experience 
of the court as a lawyer and judge; it is not necessary in the connection that he 
hear any evidence on the matter although it is proper that the court may have 
before it the opinion of experts. Smith v. Great Basirz Gmin Co., 98 Idaho 266, 
281 (1977). 
The court clearly understood its role in all of this. It understood that it was directed to determine 
and award fees to J-U-B for defending against the contract claim by this Court. And because J- 
U-B claimed that it could do that by looking back at the evidence contained in the record and 
making a decision that meant that the court should go back and review the evidence in the record 
and attempt to make such a determination and award. However, because BECO was arguing that 
it needed the opportunity to file additional briefing, the court allowed BECO that opportunity at 
the cost of the work incurred by J-U-B. Allowing the parties to file additional briefing, then 
reviewing the existing record to determine and award fees to J-U-B was not done with any 
vindictive intent of punishing BECO; rather, it was squarely within the courts discretion and 
should be upheld. 
C. The district court properly considered the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
The court's decision to award fees to J-U-B also stated that due to the objections raised 
by counsel for BECO and BECO's Petition for a Writ of Mandate against the court it was 
necessary for J-U-B to incur additional attorney fees in seeking an award on the contract claim 
for which J-U-B should be compensated in the amount of $5,540.~' Again, the court made this 
40 See Clerk's Record After Remand, p. 66. 
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decision by employing the factors laid out in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) and exercising its discretion. The 
district court's decision clearly demonstrates that it considered at least some ofthe twelve factors 
laid out under Rule 54(e)(3). It is well settled by this Court that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) does not 
require the district court to make detailed findings on each listed factor. The rule merely 
provides that the district court shall consider the factors, but does not require a finding on each 
one, as a particular listed factor may or may not be relevant to the outcome. Elliott v. Darwin 
Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 786 (2003) US.  Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 
228-29, 999 P.2d 877, 883-84 (2000); Perkins v. US. Transformer West, 132 Idaho 427,431-32, 
974 P.2d 73, 77-78 (1999); Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 638, 962 P.2d 
1018, 1022 (1998); Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. North Pacific Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 716, 
720,905 P.2d 1025, 1029 (1995); Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346,351,766 P.2d 1227, 
1232 (1988); Irwin Rogers Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 277, 833 P.2d 128, 135 
(Ct.App. 1992). This Court has further held that a trial court need not make specific findings 
demonstrating how it employed any of the factors listed in Rule 54(e)(3) but it should provide a 
record establishing that it considered the factors under the rule. Pinnacle Eng'rs v. Heron Brook, 
LLC., 139 Idaho 756, 760 (2004), See also Perki~s v. US. Transformer West, 132 Idaho 427 
(1999), and Elliot v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 2003 Ida. Lexis 60 (2003). In the 
Pinnacle case, the Court also cited its decision in Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 
774, 786 (2003) where it held that it is sufficient if the trial court states that it has taken into 
consideration the factors listed in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). In Pinnacle, the district coult's written order 
simply stated, "The court awards attorney's fees in the amount of $61,846.38." Pinnacle Eng'rs 
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v. Heron Brook, LLC., 139 Idaho 756,760 (2004). Here, the district court specifically mentioned 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors in its decision to award fees to J-U-B. 
This Court has previously upheld awards of attorney fees where the record indicates that 
the trial court considered the relevant factors even though it did not make any reference to the 
rule when making the award. In Brinkman v. Aid Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346,766 P.2d 1227 
(1988), the trial court awarded attorney fees in an amount roughly equal to the contingent fee the 
prevailing party had contracted to pay his attorneys. When making the award in Brinkman, the 
trial court mentioned only that the attorney fee was contingent and did not make any reference to 
Rule 54(e)(3) or to the other factors listed in that rule. This Court upheld the award, however, 
"because the record establishes that several of the eleven factors were argued and briefed to the 
court and there is no basis to conclude the court failed to consider each of the factors." Id This 
Court has m h e r  added that the profile of the record provided enough information to presume 
that the trial judge considered the other pertinent factors enumerated in the [rule]." Pinnacle 
Eng'rs v. Heron Brook, LLC., 139 Idaho 756, 760 (2004). These holdings are consistent with 
how the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho has applied the factors of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) 
when applying Idaho state law. That court held that "although these factors must be considered, 
it is not required that specific findings be made as to how the factors were employed or applied 
in making an award of fees. SemMaterials, L.P. v. Alliance Asphalt, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15470 (D. Idaho Mar. 1, 2007). These cases show that the district court in this case properly 
exercised its discretion and explained its findings adequately. 
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Here, the district court clearly demonstrated that it properly considered the Rule 54(e)(3) 
factors in reaching its decision by explicitly mentioning them in its decision. This provides 
convincing evidence that the court properly viewed its decision to determine and award fees to J- 
U-B as within its discretion, that it properly acted within the bounds of that discretion, and 
certainly exercised reason it reaching its decision to award J-U-B fees in the amount of $41,140. 
Therefore, this Court should uphold the district court's decision. 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED BECO'S MOTION FOR 
RELEASE OF THE CASH DEPOSIT AND CORRECTLY ORDERED THAT 
RELEASING IT BEFORE DETERMINING A PROPER FEE AWARD WOULD 
BE INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE APPLICABLE RULES. 
A. The district court properly interpreted I.A.R. 13(b)(15), and I.R.C.P. 67 and 
79(e) in making its decision to retain the cash deposit, determine and make 
an award of fees to J-U-B as required by this Court, and then returning the 
balance of the deposit to BECO. 
In its June 12, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order the district court properly 
considered and denied BECO's motion to release the cash deposit. In ruling on the motion, the 
court looked to I.A.R. 13(b)(15), I.R.C.P. 67 and I.R.C.P. 79(e). While the application of a 
procedural rule is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review, in this case the 
district court's application of the applicable rules does not reach the level of reversible error. 
Zenner v. Holcomb, 210 P.3d 552, 558 (2009). 
Rule 13(b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules governs the powers of the district court during 
the pendency of an appeal. The district court stated that I.A.R. 13(b)(15) is the subsection 
relevant to this action and it states in pertinent part: 
(b) Stay Upon Appeal - Powers of District Court - Civil Actions. 
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In civil actions, unless prohibited by order of the Supreme Court, the district court 
shall have the power and authority to rule upon the following motions and to take 
the following actions during the pendency on an appeal; 
. . . 
(15) Stay execution or enforcement of a money judgment upon the posting of a 
cash deposit ... which must be in the amount of the judgment or order, plus 36% of 
such amount. ... Any bond filed pursuant to this rule shall state that the company 
issuing or executing the same agrees to pay on behalf of the appellant all sums 
found to be due and owing by the appellant by reason of the outcome of the 
appeal, within 30 days of the filing of the remittitur from the Supreme Court, up 
to the full amount of the bond or undertaking. 
I.R.C.P. 67 provides for the making of cash deposits with the court and states: 
In an action in which any part of the relief sought is a judgment for a sum of 
money or the disposition of a sum of money or the disposition of any other thing 
capable of delivery, a party, upon notice to every other party and by leave of 
court, may deposit with the court all or any part of such sum or thing. When it is 
admitted by the pleading, or shown upon the examination of a party, that a party 
has possession, or control of, any money or other thing capable of delivery, 
which, being the subject of litigation, is held by the party as trustee for another 
party, or which belongs or is due to another party, the court may order the same, 
upon motion, to be deposited in court or delivered to such party, upon such 
conditions as may be just. Money or any other thing deposited into court under 
this rule shall be deposited and withdrawn, subject to the further directions of the 
court, and as provided by the statutes of this state. 
Furthermore, I.R.C.P. 79(e) provides for the reclamation of property following an appeal. That 
rule states in relevant part: 
At any time after the expiration of the time for appeal, the determination of an 
appeal, or the determination of a proceeding following an appeal and the 
expiration of the time for any subsequent appeal, whichever is later, any party or 
any interested person may apply to the trial court for an order permitting a 
reclamation by such party of .. . property . . . considered in connection with the 
action. The trial court in its discretion may grant such an order on such conditions 
and under such circumstances as it deems appropriate.. . . 
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The court correctly understood that the directive from this Court was limited to determining and 
awarding fees to J-U-B for defending against BECO's contract claim. I.R.C.P. 79(e) allows the 
district court discretion in granting or denying orders permitting reclamation of property in 
connection with an action "under such circumstances as it deems appropriate". Thus, the court's 
prerogative that it was inappropriate to release the cash deposit until after it determined the 
proper award of attorney fees and released those fees to J-U-B with the remaining balance to 
BECO was properly aligned with the court's goal of adhering to this Court's directive. 
4. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
BECO brought and pursued this appeal frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation 
by attacking the credibility and ability of the district court to make its decision without abusing 
its discretion. Therefore, J-U-B respectfully requests costs and fees pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 
I.A.R. 41 and Idaho Code 5 12-120(3) and Idaho Code 512-121. Idaho Code 512-121 provides 
that "[iln any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party.. .." This Court has interpreted I.C. $12-120(3), to mandate the award of attorney fees on 
appeal as well as a trial. J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chemetics Int'l, 130 Idaho 255 (1997). As the 
prevailing party on appeal, J-U-B requests an award of costs and fees on appeal. 
111. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The district court was given very specific instructions from this Court. Those instructions 
were to determine and award attorney fees to J-U-B for defending itself against BECO's breach 
of contract claim. In order to do that the court had to consider the factors outlined in I.R.C.P. 
54(e)(3). The court reached its decision by considering the record before it and argument from 
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both sides. The court was intimately familiar with the facts of the case and had already 
considered the attorney fee issue once. Thus, after reconsidering the prior award in light of this 
Court's instruction, the court properly exercised its discretion and made a reasonable award to J- 
U-B which should be upheld in its entirety with an award of costs to J-U-B. 
For all the reasons outlined above, J-U-B respectfully requests that this Court uphold the 
judgment for attorney's fees. 
, I  
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this a day of October, 2009. 
CAPITOL LAW 
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